A financial analyst who can give accurate return predictions is highly valued. This study uses a unique data set comparing CNBC's Fast Money's 'March Madness' stock picks as a proxy for analysts' stock return predictions. With this data, set up as a tournament, the analysts pick both a winner and a loser. With the tournament structure, I find that these analysts have no superior ability to pick the winning stock in terms of frequency. However, I do find that taking a long/short portfolio of their picks yields an abnormal return. Showing that although they do not pick the winning stock more often, they do pick the stocks that have the best returns over our sample.
I. Introduction
Historically there has been a significant and consistent bias for stock analysts to recommend more buys than sells. Although analysts' ability has been tested, testing analysts' ability has been difficult because of this bias. In particular, when an analyst makes a buy recommendation, it is not clear what the benchmark is. This benchmark would be more clear if these analysts would simultaneously recommend a pair of stocks; one buy and the other sell. Different from previous studies, this study capitalizes on a unique data set that provides pairs of buy and sell recommendations. 1 The stocks were first matched within industry and when a winner from each of the four industries was picked, it was matched against a winner from another industry to find the overall top pick for that year.
As previously mentioned, since there is no clear benchmark for a single buy (or sell) recommendation, traditional measures of analyst ability compare the analysts' picks relative to the overall market or industry. However, these measures may not necessarily reflect the information the analysts intend to deliver. For example, there are various industry definitions which challenge the accuracy of industry benchmark. This study can take this a step further. The tournament structure allows for the measure of the stocks they pick as their winning stocks outperform the stocks they pick to lose.
This data comes from very public (television) analysts. Most studies of similar nature have focused on one person's stock picks, primarily Jim Cramer. In addition to having both buy and sell recommendations, the data are based on a group of analysts picking one stock after deliberating on its ability to increase in value over the subsequent year. Using multiple analysts, rather than one person, could increase the knowledgebase being brought into each decision. In this sense, this study is more representative of the analyst profession than those studies focusing on an individual analyst.
CNBC's Mad Money host Jim Cramer has been the focus of many studies. Keasler and McNeil (2010) find a positive and significant announcement return, followed by a reversal that leads to no evidence of positive longer-term abnormal returns.
Engelberg, Sasseville, and Williams (2009) and Neumann and Kenny (2007) also find short term abnormal returns, however Neumann and Kenny (2007) warn small traders about transaction costs eliminating any returns when following Jim Cramer's picks.
Similar results have been found by Pari (1987) and Ferreira and Smith (2003) when looking at Wall $treet Week.
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Using this dataset, I test the analysts' ability to pick the best returning stocks over multiple time periods: a one-month, two-month, three-month, six-month, and twelvemonth time horizon. The next section will discuss both analyst bias and the data in more detail. Section three will provide an overview of the tests to measure analysts' ability.
Section four lays out our main results. I find that analysts do not predict a winner more often than a random guess, which challenges their ability to predict future returns. I use the Fama and French (1993) three factor model, with Carhart's (1997) fourth factor, to measure if the analysts could have done better if they had used these models. I find no evidence that they would have done better with these models and no evidence they used the four factor model for their analysis. Because I have matching buy/sell recommendation pairs, I put together a long/short portfolio of these picks to find that following their recommendations would have made 7.72% in 2007 and 12.72% in 2008.
These results show that although they do not have a superior ability to pick winning stocks, they do pick the stocks that have the largest returns over this period; keeping in mind that the 2007 and 2008 returns were a unique time period for the financial markets.
The last section concludes.
II. Analysts Bias and Tournament Data
Much of the prior research supports the idea that analysts' stock ratings are informed (e.g., Stickel 1995 , Womack 1996 , Barber et al. 2001 , Jegadeesh et al. 2004 , Moshirian, Ng, and Wu 2009 . However, it has also been shown that analysts tend to issue optimistic stock recommendations (Francis and Philbrick 1993 , Hodgkinson 2001 , Boni and Womack 2002 , Conrad et al. 2006 , Dugar and Nathan 1995 , Lin and McNichols 1998 , Irvine 2004 , O'Brien et al. 2005 , Jackson 2005 , Barber et al. 2006 , Cowen et al. 2006 , and Niehaus and Zhang 2010 . Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2004) show that, after controlling for transaction costs, following analysts' recommendations does not produce better performance than average returns. Cornell (2001) finds that analysts are disinclined to change recommendations when negative changes occur. Eames, Glover, and Kennedy (2002) find that analysts tend to process information in a biased manner while Friesena and Wellerb (2006) These stocks were each ranked, so the number one seed of each industry would play the sixteenth seed, the second seed would play the fifteenth seed, and so on. 4 This bracket was released before the tournament began and the analysts had time to prepare their bracket (i.e. who they would pick). Brackets for both years can be found in the appendix.
The stocks chosen to be in the tournament were not decided by the analysts. For this reason, there might be a concern that these stocks were chosen purely to boost ratings. However, given that the decision to place the stocks in the tournament are independent of the analysts themselves, and that the analysts are forced to pick a winner (and implicitly a loser), the choice of stocks put in the tournament do not bias the results. 
III. Tests for Measuring Analysts' Ability
To measure the analysts' ability, four different tests are used: Testing the ability of the analysts, comparing this to the four-factor model, testing if the analysts used the four factor model, and finding a long/short portfolio outcome.
Testing Analyst Ability to Predict More Often
In 2007 (1), will not be statistically significantly different from 0. In addition, because there is one winner and one loser of every matchup, thus β 0 will be equal to 0.5 or a random probability of predicting the correct outcome.
However, if the β 1 is statistically greater than 0, this provides evidence that the group of analysts has a superior ability to accurately predict winners.
Using the Four Factor Model Outcomes
According to the CAPM theory (Sharpe 1964) , in a two-stock match, the stock with a higher systematic risk should have a higher expected return. With the same idiosyncratic risk, this stock should have a higher chance to be the winner in the match.
Under this scenario, if the market is efficient, according to CAPM, it is predicted that the stock with a higher beta is more likely to win each matchup. Empirically, since the fourfactor model (Fama and French (1993) three factor model with Carhart's (1997) fourth factor) has a higher power than CAPM in explaining the historical stock returns, the fourfactor model is used.
To estimate the beta loadings, I use CRSP monthly returns (with dividend reinvestment) in the five years before the Fast Money show to find the expected beta at the point the analysts make their decision. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the beta loadings of sample firms. As shown in the table, the betas on the market risk premium have an average of 1.14. This shows that the stocks in the sample, on average, are slightly more risky than the market portfolio. The betas in our sample range between -0.1 and 3.4. This wide range shows that the Fast Money analysts have a choice over the firms with very low systematic risk and the firms with very high systematic risk. The betas on the other three factors all have a wide range. With the Fama and French (1993) three factor model, with Carhart's (1997) fourth factor, I can measure if using this model would predict the actual winning stock at a higher rate than the analysts did. With the simulated outcomes of this tournament, using the four factor model, I predict the outcomes and measure how the four factor model does compared to the actual outcomes.
To proxy for the expected value of the factors, I use the historical averages of these factors during the 10-year period prior to the Fast Money show. Using the four factor prediction for each matchup, including the predicted alpha, I can determine which stock is predicted to win based on the four factor model, FFwin, at the time the decision on the winner is made. With each predicted four factor winner, I regress the predicted winner on the actual winner using a Probit model.
If the four-factor model can predict a stock's future return, then I expect to have a positive β 1 . Otherwise, I am expecting the predicted outcome, FFwin, to have no correlation to the actual outcomes, y. Again, because there is one winner and one loser of every matchup, β 0 will be equal to 0.5 or a random probability of predicting the correct outcome.
The Analysts Anchoring on the Four Factor Model
Following Campbell and Sharpe (2009) With the estimated alpha and betas of the four factor model, next I take the difference in the betas between the two stocks in each matchup, stock a and stock b, to find the difference in each estimate, Δ α. The estimated beta coefficient on each of the four factors, the market return minus the risk free rate (R m -R f ), the market capitalization (SMB), book to price ratio (HML), and Carhart's four factor on momentum (UMD), are used to predict if the Fast Money analysts' use these factors to pick a winning stock. 
For Equation (3), the predicted winner is stock a (beating stock b). So the relative difference in a and b is consistent.
Portfolio
Even though there is no statistical evidence the analysts have a superior ability to predict the winners, it is possible that the stocks they chose as winners significantly outperform their losing counterpart from a portfolio's point of view; especially given that these events occurred during the financial crisis in 2007 and 2008. Therefore, I examine the performance of hedged portfolio for each year. To construct the hedged portfolio, an equal-weighted long position in all stocks the analysts chose to win and an equalweighted short position in all the stocks chose to lose. Since a wining stock in the first round can continue to be a winner/loser stock in the second round and so on, I continue to use only the first round to avoid a stock to be in both the winner stock portfolio and in the loser stock portfolio.
IV. Results
The results of each of the four sections listed above are now discussed.
Testing Analyst Ability to Predict More Often
By rule, having one winner and one loser in each contest, the β 0 is equal to 0.5, showing the constant is an equal probability of getting it correct and wrong. Table 3 shows the results from a set of Probit regressions showing the accuracy of analyst predictions on the first round of the tournament. Table 3 shows that the ability to predict a winner in the first round is not significantly different from a random guess, the predicted probability at X-bar. This shows that although these picks are highly publicized, the analysts have no predictive abilities when it comes to choosing the stocks that are actually going to outperform another stock over a time period. However the analysts average just over 40 picks, out of 63, correct.
Using the Four Factor Model Outcomes
As found above, the Fast Money analysts have no predictive power. The classic test to see if they could have done better is to compare them to another stock prediction mechanism. To do this, I test if using the four factor model would have been able to predict winners over the same time periods.
Recall that the test this only in the first round to control for any bias in the selection to the later rounds. Table 4 analyzes how the tournament predictions would have looked if the four factor model was used to determine the outcomes of each stock matchup in the first round. Finding no significant results shows that the four factor model has no superior ability to predict the actual winner. These results are similar to the results found earlier by the Fast Money analysts, except that now the average number that are correct picks is now 31. Table 5 uses the four factors individually to see if the individual use of each factor would have been a good predictor of the outcomes. Although there are no consistent prediction, having a relatively higher historical alpha and beta on the excess market return (i.e. the return to the market minus the risk free rate), relative to the other stock in the matchup, predicts a higher probability of the actual winner in three months and six months respectively. Also having a lower beta on SMB or a smaller beta on UMD increases the ability to find the actual winner over one and six months respectively. Table 5 : Probit regression results testing the power for the four-factor loadings to explain the actual outcomes in the first round of the tournament
The dependent variables in this table are actual outcomes based on cumulative stock returns over the 1, 2, 3, 6, and 12-month periods after the Fast Money show. More specifically, the 1 month actual outcome will have a value of 1 if the stock has a higher return than its match stock from the end of March to the end of April in the year of Fast Money show. The marginal effect from Probit regression models are reported. 
The Analysts Anchoring on the Four Factor Model
This section analyzes the possibility that the Fast Money analysts anchored their decisions on the four factor model. Although the results of the analysts ability to predict outcomes and four factor model's ability to predict outcomes are the same, finding no significant evidence that they have a superior ability to correctly predict the outcomes, this could be caused by the analysts using the four factor model to make their picks.
To measure any anchoring in the process, for each stock, I first estimate the betas on the fourth factors using past 5 years of data. Then the betas and the four factors over the past 10 years to predict a winner out of a two-stock pair. Historical estimates are used to determine the expected choice at the time of the tournament. The winner has a value of 1 for the FFwin variable and the loser has a value of 0. Using a Probit regression, I test if using the four factor model's predicted winner is significantly related to the predicted winner by the Fast Money analysts, Table 6 . Using this measure, there is no evidence that the Fast Money analysts used the four factor model in their predictions.
I also estimate the difference in the alpha and the betas for each of the four factors, presented in Table 7 . Although when combined I find no evidence that the Fast Money analysts use the four factor model, this will reveal whether the analysts were using an individual factor in their predictions. over the losing stocks, with a probability above random chance. I find no evidence that these analysts have the ability to pick the better performing stocks over either of these years. I also analyze if these analysts were using the Fama and French (1993) three factor model, with Carhart's (1997) fourth factor, to make their picks. There is no evidence they used the four factor model in their analysis.
However, when looking at hedged long/short portfolio I find that the analysts would have returned a yearly return of 7.72% from their 2007 picks and 12.72% from their 2008 picks, when the S&P 500 returned -10.77% and -42.42% during this same period. Following the tournament structure, if an investor would have used the four factor model to pick the winning and losing stocks for the long/short hedged portfolio they would have returned a yearly return of 2.64% from the 2007 picks and 8.8% from the 2008 picks. This reveals that although the analysts were not able to predict the winning stocks consistently, the stocks they chose to win were the stocks that had the highest relative return over this period, relative to both a four-factor portfolio and to the market on the whole.
Through this unique setup I am able to test analysts' ability. These tournaments occurred during an interesting time in our history, during the financial crisis. These results show that there is some value added by these analysts, not in the analyst's ability to predict the winner, but their ability to find a relative winner when they are forced to choose both a winner and a loser. I encourage continued research on this analyst impact and if it is driven by talent, driven by the unique time in our history (the financial crisis), or a combination of increased value of an analysts during extreme events in the financial markets.
